This paper presents recent advances in the identification problem taking into account the accuracy, complexity and privacy leak of different decoding algorithms. Using a model of different actors from literature, we show that it is possible to use more accurate decoding algorithms using reliability information without increasing the privacy leak relative to algorithms that only use binary information. Existing algorithms from literature have been modified to take advantage of reliability information, and we show that a proposed branch-and-bound algorithm can outperform existing work, including the enhanced variants.
INTRODUCTION
The identification problem in modern applications such as biometrics and brand protection is concerned with new requirements to privacy and runtime-complexity besides the classical demand for accuracy, or the performance in terms of identification error. Hence, previous work 1 is extended by coupling the existing model of identification systems to a model from literature that introduces relevant entities and their interaction; and the introduction of new and more accurate decoders. Besides an evaluation of the accuracy and runtime-complexity of the decoders, the concept of privacy is developed and the privacy protection offered by different types of identification protocols is then analysed using the interaction model.
Given the attention to privacy, a clear definition is desirable; privacy is the ability of a certain owner of data to reveal parts of that data to others or to keep data secret as desired. Therefore, in our formulation, we will consider the privacy leak as the mutual information between the original data and its representation needed for identification with a specified accuracy.
Throughout the text, boldface capital letters such as X will denote vector or matrix random variables, boldface small letters such as x denote their realisations. We use an index to indicate a vector out of a matrix, such as X(m). Constants are denoted as capitals such as N .
Entity Interaction Model
To investigate the privacy issue, we need to define certain roles in a similar spirit as in existing literature.
2 Note that a division in roles is not necessarily identical to a division in people or machines; it is a logical division rather than physical. The different entities and their interactions are depicted in Figure 1 .
The data owner controls the source of private information X. The main concern relevant to the privacy of the data owner is that the system should not reveal more information than the data owner wishes to disclose.
The data owner passes some protected data to the server, which stores it in a database shown as DB and can perform calculations on the data if desired. The server is assumed to operate properly in the sense that any desired processing will be done correctly, but it is also assumed to be transparant to all. The data owner selects such information to release as to protect its own privacy, and keeping the rest secret. In this work, the released information is a binary string derived from the complete private data, as will be further explained in Section 1.2.
The data user is a trusted entity that is to carry out the identification and is given noisy observations Y of the original data X in order to accomplish this task. The output of the identification procedure is the estimated identitym. The data user can communicate with the server or ask it to perform certain calculations, but can also perform calculations locally. In the latter case, communication with the server in the form of queries and responses are needed to obtain the necessary information.
The attacker is a hostile entity whose goal it is to gain knowledge of the private information X based on everything that the attacker can observe. The attacker can see all information in the database and monitor all calculations in the server as well as all communication between the different entities, i.e., all data disclosed by the data owner as well as the queries and responses that are exchanged between the server and the data user.
Information Processing Model
In line with previous work, 3 the model of processing information in the system proceeds as shown in Figure  2 . The data owner has some private data and needs to process it in order to come to a set of data that will be disclosed. This stage is generally known as the enrollment. The source of the original private data is modelled by a continuous memoryless source X with some distribution p(x). One of the differences with classical communication setups is that the distribution p(x) is given rather than chosen.
During the enrollment stage, the dimensionality of the data is reduced from N to L < N to extract a socalled template. The reduction is accomplished by applying random projections; 4 we use an approximation of a so-called orthoprojector Ψ, where each Ψ i,j ∼ N (0, 1 N ). The dimensionality reduction step transforms x intõ x. Then, binary data b x is extracted fromx by taking the signs of the projections. That b x is disclosed by the data owner by sending it to the server, thus completing the enrollment.
The second stage is the identification, and is executed by the data user. The data user can process the received data y in a similar manner as the data owner to obtainỹ and b y . It is then up to the data user to complete the identification with this information and any communication with the server. The decoding algorithm employed by the data user determines the complexity and privacy leak.
An inherent assumption of the application is the presence of noise in the data Y that is received by the data user, that should be considered as a degraded version of the original private data X. The probabilistic mismatch between X and Y is modelled by the channel p(y|x). The identification capacity C id 5 is I(X; Y) where I(.; .) is the mutual information.
6 As a consequence of the projections, the achievable rate reduces to I(X;Ỹ). 3, 7 The equivalent channel between the binary vectors B x and B y follows the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) model, resulting in an achievable rate of I(B x ; B y ). 
The Identification System
Combining the two presented models for interaction and information processing, the final system is then characterized by the following configuration: X is the private data possesed by the data owner, and B x is the released information that is communicated to the server and stored there. Let the communication between the data user and the server be denoted as A, then the attacker has access to B x (m) for all m ∈ {1 . . . M} and A. The communicated data A depends on the decoding algorithm.
A more strict definition of privacy can be formulated as the uncertainty that the attacker has about the private information X given B x and A, which can be expressed mathematically as h(X|B x , A), where h(.) stands for the differential entropy. This definition is closely linked to the definition of privacy leakage as the mutual information I(X; B x , A), similar to definitions in literature. 8 The link between the privacy and the privacy leak can be expressed using Shannon's equivocation I(X; A) , with equality when h(B x , A|X) = 0.
It can be derived that h(X|B
x , A) ≥ h(X) − h(B x ,
DECODERS
In order to communicate along the principles of digital communications, both the transmitter and the decoder are supposed to have access to a codebook or database, which is a list of codewords that each represent a particular message. Different communication setups use different types of codebooks. Practical communication schemes tend to use structured codebooks, but in the applications targetted in this work, the codebook is considered to be generated randomly. As a result of the fact that the data to enroll is assumed to be randomly generated from the aforementioned given source X, the stored data in the database is random as well, as it is a function of the original random data. The codebook is in this work assumed to be a collection of binary strings b x (m) where m ∈ {1 . . . M} and M is the cardinality of the codebook.
Hard v.s. Soft Decoding
The optimal maximum-likelihood decoder for the BSC reduces to a minimum Hamming distance decoder. Let d H (., .) denote the Hamming distance between two binary sequences, then the minimum Hamming distance decoder is:m = arg min
Much better performance can be obtained by using soft information. Decoding could take place in the dimensionality-reduced domain using the following decoding rule for Gaussian data, which can be expected after projections due the use of Gaussian basis vectors:
Under condition thatx T (m)x(m) is equal for all m, this decoding rule is equal to the maximization of the empirical correlation ρX (m),Ỹ =x T (m)ỹ. However, such soft decoding requiresx(m) for all m, but these are not available, so that this decoding rule cannot be used.
A decoding rule has been introduced 1 that is based on b x andỹ, leading to superior accuracy compared to hard decoders such as the minimum Hamming distance decoder, but without requiring knowledge of anyx(m). The soft decoding rules require the same kind of data to be communicated between the data user and the server as long as the soft information remains on the side of the data user; soft decoders also have the same complexity as hard decoding. As only binary data is communicated, we will extend the previous work 1 by showing in the Section 3 that this improved accuracy does not lead to loss in privacy.
If a binary alphabet {−1, 1} is used to represent the codebook, the following metric is used to assign a score to different items that are found in the codebook during the search:
This metric is an estimate of the correlation; note thatx(m) can be decomposed asx i (m) = sign(x i (m)) |x i (m)| where |x i (m)| denotes the magnitude.ỹ can be decomposed similarly, then the correlation can be computed as:
It can be shown thatρX (m),Ỹ is an estimator for ρX (m),Ỹ . 
Exhaustive Search
Exhaustive search decoders simply evaluate each entry in the codebook with respect to the channel output according to any approximation of a maximum-likelihood rule and therefore all have a time-complexity of O(M L). When the data user employs an exhaustive search algorithm, the communicated data A is simply equal to binary codebook b x , which is sent from the server to the data user.
NP-hard and NP-soft decoders
An alternative decoder design is based on heuristic-guided backtracking algorithms that try to find the most likely match in the binary codebook by flipping a fraction of the L bits starting with the least reliable ones, inspired by DPLL-solvers for the Satisfiability problem. 9, 10 This covers the most likely original codewords and is therefore an approximation of an ML-decoder. For this type of decoders, the communicated data A consists of queries in the form of bitpatterns derived from b y and responses indicating whether or not that bitpattern exists in the codebook b x (m), where m ∈ 1 . . . M, stored at the server.
In the expansion of the search tree, there are several conditions that can lead to the decision to not expand the current node, i.e. to prune the tree. First, if as many bits have already been flipped as we may expect based on the BSC-channel properties, then it makes no sense to continue flipping more bits. Second, the construction of the search tree is such that nodes at a deeper level always have a lower score than those that lie above it, as every flipped bit changes a positive factor into a negative one in the calculation of the log-likelihood. Thus, if a previously found bitpattern exists in the codebook, and the value of the metric in the current node is equal or less than that of the previously found solution, then there is no reason to continue to try to flip bits until another valid codeword has been found, as the latters log-likelihood cannot be higher.
Bits are not flipped at random, but rather selected by reliability. The least reliable bits are flipped first, corresponding to the most likely modifications. This information ensures that the most likely bit-patterns are also likely to be tried first, thus further reducing the runtime by facilitating the pruning of the tree based on the log-likelihood.
Kalker-Haitsma System
An adaptation of the system proposed by Kalker and Haitsma 11 can be used to search the codebook faster than an exhaustive search, albeit at a cost in accuracy. The system requires the creation of look-up tables for blocks of the codewords. The basic idea behind the the system is that although the entire channel output is very likely to have errors and therefore is hard to find, the binary output can be divided into small blocks that are likely to pass error-free, and therefore can be used directly. During identification, a list of matching codewords is retrieved for each block of the channel output using the look-up tables.
In this article, we have modified the Kalker-Haitsma system relatively to our previous implementation 1 to use reliability information to improve the accuracy. All candidates found using look-up tables are then evaluated according to the metric shown in Equation 2. The time-complexity has been evaluated in previous work as the number of candidates to be processed, therefore the change to use soft information does not alter the complexity.
PRIVACY ANALYSIS
We will show that for the chosen decoders the privacy leak is due only to the data revealed during enrollment. Under the chosen assumptions that the attacker has access to B x and A, we will show that the privacy is
for both the exhaustive and shooting type of decoders. In other words, in both cases there is no privacy leak other than the one chosen by the data owner.
Other than the disclosed data B x , a second source of information for the attacker can be the communication between the server and the data user A. Under the formulation of the problem as presented in Section 1.1 stating that the attacker has no access to any information available to the data user other than the communication with the server, and with the decoders described in Section 2 running on the side of the data user, the attacker cannot gain anything beyond what is already available in the form of B x .
The only data communicated between the server and the data user for exhaustive search decoders is the codebook B x which is already known to the attacker. Thus, for exhaustive search decoders A = B x , from which it follows that h(X|B
For the "NP-soft" type of decoders, the communication A consists of B y , which is a function of B x (m) for some m, and modified version of B y , some of which may be valid entries in the codebook. The responses are in this case indicators showing if such an entry is in the codebook or not. Given that B y is a degraded version of B x , it can be expressed as a function of B x , i.e. B y = g(B x ), so that h(X|B x , A) = h(X|B x , B y ) = h(X|B x , g(B x )) = h(X|B x ). Hence, the attacker cannot gain any more accurate information about X from B y than from B x .
Likewise, for the Kalker-Haitsma System, as long as the calculation of the metric remains on side of the data user, the privacy is not negatively affected. The Kalker-Haitsma System requires the creation of look-up tables, but these are determined entirely by the codebook, which is available to the attacker. Queries to the server would consist of blocks of the binary channel output, which are but parts of a distorted version of information already available to the attacker.
In conclusion, the attacker cannot learn anything about the private information X other than that which has been disclosed by the data owner. What is more important however, is the fact that the information disclosed to the attacker is the same for hard and soft decoding strategies, on the strict condition that the calculation is executed on the side of the data user. Therefore, the superior accuracy of soft decoders can safely be exploited without sacrifice to either privacy or complexity. Clearly, the use of an approximation of the cross-correlation significantly improves the performance in terms of accuracy compared to the Hamming distance. Although the complexity of both exhaustive search algorithms is considered equivalent, it is clear from Figure 4 that Hamming distance calculations are faster in practice.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The original Kalker-Haitsma System performs less well than the exhaustive Hamming distance decoder, but is significantly faster. As predicted, the block size has a significant influence on both the speed and the accuracy.
A very interesting phenomenon is that the NP-hard decoder outperforms the straightforward exhaustive Hamming-distance decoder. The only explanation we have for this is that in certain cases, several codewords will have the same Hamming distance to the channel output. In such cases, both decoders will select the codeword they first come across. For the exhaustive decoder, that is the codeword with the lowest index in the codebook. For the NP-hard decoder on the other hand, the most likely variations on the channel output are tried first, so the first codeword found has a higher probability of being correct than the one with the lowest index of all codewords having the same Hamming distance to the channel output.
The Kalker-Haitsma decoders using soft reliability information perform very different depending on the blocksize. For a blocksize of 8, the accuracy is greatly improved, near to that of the exhaustive search decoder using the cross-correlation approximation. For a blocksize of 16 however, the performance remains unchanged. This result could indicate that with that blocksize, the algorithm too frequently misses the correct binary codeword, which prevents any advantage from a more advanced metric to evaluate candidates.
Compared to the exhaustive search cross-correlation decoder, the NP soft decoder shows almost identical performance, but at a significantly reduced calculation time, especially for higher SNRs. It is more accurate than the Kalker-Haitsma decoder with 8-bit blocks using a cross-correlation metric, and, for high SNRs, it is even faster.
CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the identification problem taking into account the accuracy, complexity and privacy leak of different decoding algorithms. Using a model of different actors, we have shown that it is possible to use more accurate decoding algorithms using reliability information without increasing the privacy leak relative to algorithms that only use binary information.
Additionally, we have shown that existing algorithms can be modified to take advantage of reliability information, and that the proposed branch-and-bound algorithm can outperform existing work in terms of accuracy, and, depending on the SNR, can compete in terms of calculation time.
Future work will focus on the incorporation of security aspects into the considered setup, as well as the investigation of possible improvements in complexity without loss of accuracy.
